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Cady: choosing our better

Choosing Our Better History:
Religion, Secularism,
and American Public Life
Linell Cady

I am delighted for this opportunity to participate in the Macalester
Civic Forum and to explore with you some “big” normative questions
about our civic life. All too often academics feel constrained to dwell
upon smaller questions—some say ever smaller questions—so I welcome this chance to think about the bigger picture.
I have been invited to reflect upon the question, “What should be the
role of religion in contemporary American public life?” That certainly
counts as a big question, and one that invariably touches a nerve. The
very question, and its inflection, signals the conflicts, uncertainties, and
anxieties surrounding religion in our current moment.
Religion has re-emerged as a problem, a problem most Americans
in the 20th century thought they had pretty much solved by a wall of
separation between our public life and private faiths. In recent decades,
religious actors and movements have increasingly “gone public,” challenging the constitutional underpinnings and historical adequacy of
the wall metaphor. Consensus about the place of religion in American
life has unraveled, and we are less sure about the rules of the game.
Skirmishes over the place of religion in American public life have
become regular features of our cultural landscape. In recent years, we
have grown accustomed to religiously inflected disputes over abortion,
sexuality, stem cell research, prayer in schools, religious symbolism in
public spaces…and the list goes on. These are not isolated disputes
with changing coalitions, but episodes in the so-called “culture wars”
that have rocked American society for decades. Although most Americans may stand on the sidelines of this struggle, its extreme camps
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have spawned dueling public narratives over the place of religion in
American life and identity—narratives that constitute the inescapable
backdrop to our reflections on this topic.1
I. Dueling Public Narratives
One story recounts the emergence of a creeping secularism that has
taken hold of American public life in the latter half of the twentieth
century. Framing secularism as another religion, this story mobilizes
“people of faith” to fight back against the privatization and marginalization of their voice in American life. The second narrative, essentially
a mirror image of the first, traces a dangerously expansive conservative religious movement that is threatening to take down the secular
consensus and values of our democratic public life. If the rhetorical
power of the first story is driven by the idea of secularism as another
religion, the second draws strength from hurling charges of impending theocracy at those religious discourses and movements seeking to
transform secular American law and practices.2
To take just one example, consider the highly charged rhetoric
surrounding the issue of gay marriage. Its legalization in California
prompted religious conservatives to campaign vigorously last fall for
Proposition 8, a ballot initiative to ban it. In an obvious effort to raise
passions and the stakes, Donald Wildmon, a leading conservative
Christian evangelical leader, announced that the culture war itself hung
in the balance. If the proposition to prohibit gay marriage went down
to defeat, he pronounced, “the culture war is over and Christians have
lost” and “gradually, secularism will replace Christianity as the foundation of our society.”3 Clearly designed to mobilize sympathizers, this
intensified rhetoric succinctly captures the oppositional construction
of religion and secularism that has anchored and fueled the religious
right, a movement that has successfully institutionalized itself through
media outlets, think tanks, and grassroots organizations.
Significantly, if not surprisingly, a similar oppositional rhetoric is
deployed to very different ends by the opposing camp, especially evident in the spate of new books attributed to the “new atheists,” a
group that includes such figures as Sam Harris, Richard Dawkins, and
Christopher Hitchens.4 Aptly dubbed “missionary secularists,” these
figures are waging a highly visible campaign to position religion as a
dangerous, irrational force. Consider, for example, the efforts of Sam
Harris in his book-length screed The End of Faith. In caricaturist fashion
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he equates religion with superstition, irrationality, and violence against
which he sets secularism, the font of reason, progress, and peace. Especially telling, for Harris one is either an enlightened secularist or a
religious fundamentalist—there is no middle ground. A religious moderate who imagines otherwise is really, he insists, a “failed fundamentalist.” Or if you want the short story, just note the subtitle of Hitchens’
book, How Religion Poisons Everything. You may be familiar with a far
more entertaining variant of this position that has entered popular culture in the form of Bill Maher’s new movie Religulous, a neologism that
blends religion and the ridiculous to obvious satirical ends.
I mention these antipodes of the culture wars, not to endorse either
of these two approaches, but to take stock of the broader context within
which we are located. Even if one does not align explicitly with either
pole, their narratives now saturate our contemporary moment—thoroughly if not exclusively. In so doing, these stories inhabit us, shaping
and constricting the imaginative repertoire through which we engage
our world. The media has played a critical role in sustaining these
story lines. To some extent this reflects their penchant for “conflict narratives” that help to generate interest and sales. But even beyond that
it reflects, as Diane Winston has shown, the media’s embrace of a new
framework for religion reporting. Throughout much of the 20th century, refracting the legacy of the Scopes trial, the media story line was
“true believers as fools” and scientists as “heroes.” This interpretive
angle has kept substantive coverage of religion outside of mainstream
secular media.5 Yet it also facilitated the dominance of a public Protestantism, helping it to operate largely under the radar screen. Things
have changed in the past few decades. Through the influence of the
media-savvy religious right, we have seen the ascendancy of another
news narrative “privileging culture wars and clashing civilizations,”
which has allowed conservative religious voices to own religion in the
public sphere.6 As a result, liberal and progressive religious voices and
values have been largely eclipsed from the coverage and their presence
in our imaginative repertoire correspondingly reduced—at least until
recently. There are now some indications suggesting we have entered a
transitional moment, which may be opening up new ways of envisioning and enacting the public role of religion.
As should be evident from this quick snapshot of the polarized
landscape, it is impossible to think clearly about the role of religion in
American public life without also taking into account the nature and
positioning of the secular. They are a conceptual pair, and exploring
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them in tandem is necessitated by the growing recognition of their
deeply tangled relationship.7 We are now in a period of considerable
flux and conflict regarding how to think about their relationship and
how to embody it within the institutional spaces of our collective lives.
The United States is not the only site embroiled in such realignment.
The public resurgence of religion, and its extensive politicization, has
been a feature of politics in recent decades around the world, from Iran,
to Turkey, to India. These religio-political movements have, nationally
and globally, succeeded in disrupting the taken-for-granted dominance
and legitimacy of secularism within public life.
My aim is to work toward a more adequate model for envisioning
the public role of religion in American life by positioning it in relationship to the two dominant discourses that compete for public attention.
I want to explore the differing forms of secularism that inform these
discourses, and their implications for the public role of religion. By
recognizing more clearly how these discursive traditions operate in the
public marketplace of ideas, we can gain some distance from them and
open up space for thinking differently. I will first sketch out these two
versions of secularism, considering some historical touchstones and
contemporary expressions, and then consider their theoretical and normative adequacy. Essentially, I will argue that each offers a truncated,
simplified picture of the religious/secular landscape in American life,
past and present. Each fails, in different ways for different reasons,
to adequately address the conundrum of making room for religion in
a religiously plural, secular, democratic state. I will then turn to the
2008 presidential election, which not only offers a window on the cross
currents of our moment, but augurs a promising shift in the politics of
religion. Barack Obama, who distances himself from both of the dominant pictures, illuminates a different trajectory for negotiating the religion-secular divide in American life. In so doing he offers resources for
a different kind of story about the place of religion in American public
life, one that does justice to our better history.8
II. Variants of Secularism
Much of the power of secularism has come from its ability to present
itself as a natural category that maps onto the world in an unproblematic fashion. By defining itself against religion, which it aligns with the
parochial and the private, secularism has positioned itself as a neutral
space and discourse, that which is held in common, and so appropri-
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ately public, even universal. The challenges of religious movements
worldwide to the avowed neutrality of secularism have prompted
scrutiny of this discursive formation and generated work on the roots
and varieties of secularism across time and place.9 We are now beginning to see more clearly the way in which the categories of religion and
the secular work in tandem to make possible the formation of modern
selves and societies. This includes the secular nation-state operating
in a global economic order as well as rhetorics of privacy, freedom,
and natural self-interest that fashion a self suitable for inhabiting such
an order. As Timothy Fitzgerald explains, “By constructing religion
and religions, the imagined secular world of objects and markets as
the result of the free association of natural individuals, has also been
constructed.”10 From a quite different angle and genealogy that builds
upon the Christian contrast between the worldly and the spiritual, the
conceptual distinction between religion and the secular helps to sustain the (always relative) independence and purity of religion. In short,
rather than view the religion/secular classification as a universal template that maps seamlessly onto the world, the multiple streams that
flow into its formation and its cultural work in configuring our world
have moved to center stage.
Political Scientist Elizabeth Hurd has called attention to two distinctive traditions of Western secularism that align themselves differently
with religion.11 She distinguishes between what she terms a laicist secularism and a Christian/Judeo-Christian secularism, a tradition that in
at least one of its American trajectories has expanded from its narrowly
Protestant roots to include Catholics and Jews during the course of its
20th-century development. Her work is especially useful in illuminating the versions of secularism promoted in and through our dominant
public discourses surrounding religion.
Laicist secularism (sometimes called aggressive secularism or strong
secularism) represents one camp in the culture wars and clearly powers the rhetoric of “the new atheists.” Its lineage, however, is much
older, rooted in the narrative of secularization that has played such
a central role in the formation of the modern Western imaginary. In
basic outline this is a story of progress that links modernization with
the process through which religion is disentangled from the various
domains of social life—from politics to economics to science—and
located within its own private domain. It is a celebratory narrative that
traces the emancipation of humanity from the tyranny of ecclesiastical
authorities, from the darkness of superstition, and from the religious
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violence that engulfed early modern Europe. In this telling, the privatization of religion makes room for the emergence of secular modernity
that is envisioned as the teleological movement toward greater peace,
freedom, and enlightenment.
Laicist secularism is embedded within a narrative of separation
that imagines an oppositional, clean, and fixed divide between secular
domains and discourses and religion. Its legitimacy is rooted in the
presumption that this divide that secures the separation of religion
and politics can be readily and permanently drawn apart from disputes within religion and politics. Secularism in this form, as Hurd
notes, “presents itself as having risen above the messy debate over
religion and politics, standing over and outside the melee in a neutral
space of its own creation.”12 It is this very claim, though, that rings
increasingly hollow in a world where the politics of secularism have
become so heated and divisive, pointing to the inescapable conclusion
that far from providing the neutral framework for disentangling religion and politics, laicist secularism is itself “located on the spectrum of
theological politics.”13
The second tradition of secularism, reflecting accommodationist
rather than separationist proclivities toward religion, envisions Christianity (and in one of its tributaries, Judeo-Christianity) as the historical ground and civilizational context within which the distinction
between religion and the secular is made. Although committed to the
institutional separation of church and state, this tradition does not
seek to limit the intersections of religion and politics. To the contrary,
Christian values and practices are envisioned as the wellspring from
which secular democratic institutions and values draw sustenance.
This tradition envisions a continuum, if not fusion, between Christian
and national identity and mission. It is this understanding that makes
possible the interpretation of the United States on two registers simultaneously: a secular state within the international system of states and a
nation with a divine mission to spread democracy and freedom.14
These two traditions of secularism are now colliding in American
public life, with each side engaged in a seemingly winner-take-all battle to determine the public role of religion. Each side seeks to position
itself as the guardian of America’s founding principles and historical
trajectory, reading the other out of the historical record. Neither model
for envisioning the place of religion in American public life can in
isolation account for the interplay of religion and secular and national
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discourses and practices, and neither provides a compass for moving
forward.
The tradition of laicist secularism resonates with the separationist
logic and Enlightenment voices that, in collaboration with religious
dissenters, gave shape to the American model of church/state separation. However, the term “secularism” was not used by the framers, and
only came into usage as a political movement and distinctive theory
of life in England in the mid-19th century.15 In the United States it
was not until the late 19th century, and accelerating rapidly in the
20th, that this version of secularism came to dominate, particularly
among the educated elite. The universities were one of the primary
sites for its incubation and transmission.16 Over a couple of decades
the broadly Christian assumptions that shaped higher education in the
United States, and sustained a unitary vision of truth, gave way to a
more specialized disciplinary landscape embodying a new paradigm
of knowledge that separated facts from values. This shift, as Christian
Smith describes it, was part of a broader “secular revolution” in American life carried out by a cadre of elites “who were largely skeptical,
freethinking, agnostic, atheist, or theologically liberal; who were well
educated and socially located mainly in knowledge-production occupations; and who generally espoused materialism, naturalism, positivism and the privatization or extinction of religion.”17 For the most part,
this tradition of secularism in the American setting avoided outright
hostility to religion and settled comfortably into a liberal embrace of a
secular public sphere and private religious faith.
If higher education was at the forefront in effecting this social transformation, the courts were critical in its further solidification, particularly in the post-World War II period. It was a 1947 Supreme Court
decision that invoked the metaphor of the “wall of separation” between
church and state, quoting from an 1802 letter of Thomas Jefferson to
the Danbury Baptist Association. This was the first in a series of judicial rulings that pushed a more separationist agenda between government and religion, with the public schools at the epicenter of the shift.
Legal scholar Noah Feldman notes that this shift “could never have
won at the polls,” but it “could become the consensus among educated
elites who looked on their opponents as regressive and insufficiently
attuned to the rights of minorities. To embrace legal secularism was,
for the Court, continuous with a set of liberal values characteristic of
enlightened citizens and educated jurists.”18
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It was this tradition of secularism that John F. Kennedy invoked in
the 1960 presidential campaign in his famous speech seeking to defuse
the political liabilities of his Catholic faith. He had to counter a long
history of prejudice against Catholics who were suspected of being
not American enough and not democratic enough due to perceived
loyalty and obedience to the Pope. Kennedy’s strategy was to insist
that his faith was irrelevant to politics. As he forthrightly proclaimed,
“I believe in an America where the separation of church and state is
absolute.”19 Although anchored in the imperative to separate religious
and civil authorities, this metaphor did considerably more work for
Kennedy in terms of separating religion and politics more broadly. He
moved readily between the constitutional and institutional separation
of church and state to the much broader claim about the separation
of religion and politics. Religion, Kennedy proclaimed, is an entirely
“private affair” and irrelevant to what he repeatedly referred to as the
“real” issues of political life, such as hunger, poverty, and education.
A map picturing a neatly divided secular public versus private religion
landscape became the dominant paradigm in the social sciences in
the middle decades of the 20th century. Reading the history of American democracy through this paradigm contributed to generations of
scholarship that essentially screened out the religious, primarily Protestant, strands shaping American identity, law, and politics.20 So too
with foreign policy analysts and international relations scholars who,
imagining religion as private or epiphenomenal, were surprised and
theoretically unprepared to account for its resurgence and politicization in international and global affairs.21 Taking the wall of separation
as the defining metaphor and script for the relationship of religion,
national identity, and politics more broadly has blinded us to their collusions and fusions in American life. In so doing, we essentially take
one strand of a thicker rope and assume it can stand in for the whole.
We lose sight of what has sometimes been called “voluntary establishments,” no doubt too innocent a term to capture the coercive and
exclusionary dimensions that flow from them.
Alexis de Tocqueville, a 19th-century Frenchman, zeroed in on this
truth about the place of religion in American life in his frequently cited
Democracy in America. Famously remarking that religion in America is
the “first of their political institutions,” that it “reigns without obstacles,
by universal consent,” he called attention to the deep and pervasive
influence of Protestantism in American life that continued despite, even
because of, its formal legal disestablishment.22 When the country was
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founded, more than 95% of the Euro-American population was Protestant, with over 90% from the Reformed tradition.23 This religio-cultural
homogeneity ensured a tacitly shared set of assumptions, sensibilities,
and practices, from individualism, to legalism, to Bible-centered religion. Remarking on the partnership between religion and politics, Tocqueville observed, “Americans combine the notions of Christianity and
of liberty so intimately in their minds that it is impossible to make them
conceive the one without the other.”24 The institutional separation of
church and state, as William Connelly puts it, worked “to soften sectarian divisions between Christian sects while retaining the civilizational
hegemony of Christianity in a larger sense.”25 Tocqueville saw in early
19th-century America a continuity, even a fusion, between Protestant
Christianity and American democratic political life. This was in striking contrast to his own country where the revolution pitted national,
democratic, and enlightenment interests against the authoritarianism
and power of the dominant Roman Catholic Church. Indeed, this hostile encounter was the incubator for laicist secularism, making France
its paradigmatic exemplar. The institutional separation of church and
state did not signal or produce a clean separation between religion and
national identity, mission, and politics, but a framework that fostered,
as Hugh Heclo articulates it, “a twisting helix of reciprocal influences”
between Christianity and American democracy.26
This interpretive angle opens up a very different picture of the religion/secular divide, bringing into focus their continuities, collusions,
and fusions. Recent revisionist studies have illuminated this terrain.
From abolition to the civil rights movement, from prohibition to the
new war on drugs, religious voices and movements have been at the
epicenter of the conflicts that have transformed American laws, practices, and institutions.27 As James Morone puts it, “the campaigns leave
deep legacies: they lead us to rewrite laws, reinterpret the Constitution,
reshape the political culture, and create new public agencies.”28 The
secularist model that envisions a clean and settled division between the
domains of religion and secular public life is a still portrait, frozen in
time. What we need is a moving picture to capture the processes in and
through which secular and religious formations are constituted and
reconstituted. Failure to recognize this process blinds us to the ways in
which secularism refracts the religious sensibilities and assumptions
of the majority tradition. In fact, so concerned to counter this failure,
some now prefer the term “protestant secularism” to make perfectly
clear that secularism is not neutrality or the antithesis of religion.29
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We cannot really get a handle on the religious inflections and shifts
in American national identity unless we escape from an oppositional
model that imagines secular national identity over against religious
identity. American identity and Protestant identity have been deeply
tangled from the earliest days of the country’s founding. The historical
record of prejudice and violence against Native Americans, or Mormons, or Catholics, has reflected a deep sense that they are un-American, not one of “us.” The trajectory has certainly moved in the direction
of broadening the American-Protestant linkage. By mid-20th-century,
the Protestant mainstream was “widening into a triple mainstream” to
include Catholics and Jews.30 Tellingly, the term “Judeo-Christianity”
was invented as a way to construct a shared tradition and interfaith
coalition for a country whose population had grown far more diverse
since its origins. Despite this widening of the mainstream, Christianity
retains its dominant position, and we continue to hear voices, such as
a Donald Wildmon who explicitly, though now anxiously rather than
triumphantly, reference a “Christian America.”
These two traditions of secularism, with their distinctive roots,
champions, and implications for the public role of religion, jostle in
complicated ways in contemporary American life. Consider that in the
mid-1900s, when Kennedy was successfully appealing to an absolute
wall of separation between religion and secular public life and politics,
Congress was inserting “under God” into the Pledge of Allegiance,
while the prophetically inspired civil rights movement was profoundly
transforming the American landscape. Not only does this point to the
tangled interactions (on occasion partnerships) of these divergent traditions of secularism, but it captures the varied ways in which religion
can shape public life—sometimes serving a priestly function in sacralizing national identity and mission, and other times serving a prophetic transformative function.
Focusing on these distinctive traditions of secularism and the place
they each accord religion helps to locate us within our contemporary
moment. Identifying their contours and some of their expressions helps
us to see better some of the constraints and possibilities of our time. By
working in, through, and against these secular formations that have
shaped our past (and continue to shape our present), we can begin to
more adequately envision and accommodate the role of religion in our
pluralistic democracy.
Neither model or tradition of secularism serves us well as we move
into this next century. Exposing the mythic distortions of the standard
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secularization narrative is especially important at this historical juncture. As I tried to show in this brief sketch, it does not capture the manner in which religious voices and values have in fact shaped American
life, including national identity and mission, and so offers a serious
misreading. Consider its potential ramifications as Americans engage
in the dubious process of exporting democracy around the world.
Pushing the myth that American democracy is secular democracy, as
if religious dimensions were truly privatized, is to export a vision that
does not begin to capture the dynamics of our own history. It is a stunning erasure of the religious dimension of democratizing movements
in the United States, and so contributes to our imaginative failure to
recognize democratic impulses in religious movements abroad, not to
mention authoritarian, anti-democratic leanings that operate under the
rubric of the secular. The misreading of the religion/secular boundary
in American life also contributes to another form of erasure closer to
home, blinding us to the way in which some religious sensibilities and
values inform and align with secular discourses and practices more
than others. These informal establishments allow an unmarked religion to dominate—without even being named—and at the same time
marginalize different religious voices and formations.31
If laicist secularism can be faulted for its theoretical failure to reveal
its religious inflections, it is also vulnerable to theological critique for
privileging some forms of religion rather than others. Although portraying itself as a level playing field for all religious expressions, it is,
as we have seen, more accommodating of some than of others. Those
religious traditions that accentuate individual and private faith are
especially at home within this secularist formation. In this vein many
have rightly noted the easy fit with Christianity, especially Protestant traditions, compared with, say, the conundrum of locating Native
American traditions within the religion/secular framework. It is also
important to recognize the way in which it flattens theological alternatives, even within the Christian tradition. Suggesting that Christianity can easily align itself within the private domain is to privilege a
particular theological resolution to the relationship between Christian
faith and the broader world. As H. Richard Niebuhr so clearly demonstrated in his classic work Christianity and Culture, there are a variety of
ways in the past two millennia in which Christians have worked out
this problem, a problem that parallels the challenges we are dealing
with here. A resolution that rests comfortably within a fixed separation
between religion and the wider culture fails to embody the transforma-
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tive imperative that Christian faith, and the prophetic tradition more
generally, have recognized.
The alternate tradition of Christian secularism envisions Christianity as the cultural ground or bedrock that sustains the unifying values
of democratic politics and national identity. Although this tradition
has been more accommodating of religious expressions, the privileged
role of Christianity has made it unequally so. In forging such a powerful link between religion, national identity, and mission, this tradition
founders on the rocks of increasing religious pluralism in the United
States. Its limitations grow even more apparent from a global perspective. The fusion of religious and political identity in this tradition of
secularism, as Charles Taylor argues, goes beyond the national arena to
shape civilizational identity: “the sense people have of the basic order
by which they live” and which commonly provides a sense of “superiority and goodness.”32 In so doing, it constitutes a modern variant of
Christendom, with all of the dangers of that formation in global politics
today. It sustains and fuels the highly misleading narrative of a “clash
of civilizations” that rests upon notions of homogenous, bounded, and
static cultures that are maintained and defended in opposition to the
“other” without.
III. Religion and Politics in the Obama Era
The 2008 presidential election offers an illuminating angle into the
changing fortunes of these traditions of secularism in contemporary
American life.33 Through the prism of presidential campaigning and
politics we can see these versions of secularism as more than disembodied abstractions. They are discursive strategies that politicians pursue in their appeals to the electorate. Whether the appeals are genuine,
calculating, or some mixture of both, they provide a window into contemporary currents in American life, currents that politicians can never
afford to stray too far from. Focusing on the 2008 election of Barack
Obama is especially revealing for our topic. Obama’s vision of the
role of religion in American public life does not sit easily within either
tradition of secularism, although he is clearly working out his own
position in light of and in relationship to them. In and through his
criticisms and challenges, he gestures toward a distinctly different way
of navigating the religion/secular divide. It is one, I shall argue, that
offers a more promising way for envisioning and enacting the role of
religion in our pluralist secular democracy. It is not that he is a trail-
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blazer, without precedents in American history. But he draws upon
religious and cultural currents that have been largely eclipsed by the
polarization of the culture wars. That he could be elected is a signal of
a changing landscape and, we may hope, impatience with the reigning
alternatives. Unlike most politicians, he offers more than the occasional
scattered references to religion and its intersections with politics. In
two best-selling books, speeches, and a series of revealing interviews,
he sets forth a fairly robust picture of the appropriate place of religion
in American public life.
Obama cast his presidential bid in terms of moving past the deep
cultural divisions that have marked American life in the past few
decades, including the division between a “religious America” and a
“secular America.” Critical of the Republican Party’s exploitation of
this divide to mobilize voters, he also chastises Democrats for hiding
behind a version of secularism that imagines that religious faith and
values are irrelevant in political and public life. He admits to being
tempted by this “strategy of avoidance.” When his opponent in his
first senate race said “Jesus Christ would not vote for Barack Obama,”
his initial thought was that he was running to be Senator, not Minister, of Illinois.34 Reconsidering, he concluded that this secularist strategy allowed conservatives to define authentic religion, and it failed to
honor the appropriate role and place of religion in American democracy. Not only are most Americans religious, but also “the majority of
great reformers in American history,” he notes, “were not only motivated by faith, but repeatedly used religious language to argue for
their cause.”35
Although rejecting the separationst model that privatizes religion,
Obama is even more dismissive of those who yoke American identity and democratic politics too tightly to a single religious tradition,
whether Christianity or the newly invented Judeo-Christian tradition.
This is a recurring refrain in his writings and speeches. As he remarks
in a 1997 address, “Whatever we once were, we are no longer just a
Christian nation.” This same point makes its way into his presidential inaugural address, when he claims our “patchwork heritage” as a
strength: “We are a nation of Christians and Muslims, Jews and Hindus—and nonbelievers.”36 This is a symbolically profound observation. Noteworthy, of course, is the prominent place accorded Muslims,
an effort to counter their all-too-frequent demonization. Although
Muslims have for centuries been seen as the menacing “other” in the
formation of Western identity, this has been rekindled in the aftermath
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of September 11, with revealing episodes during the campaign when
charges that Obama was a Muslim were hurled as slurs. Also noteworthy, and unprecedented, is his explicit embrace of nonbelievers as
full members of the American community. This counters a long tradition in which religious identity (initially Protestantism, though slowly
expanding) functions as a litmus test for national identity, and faith is
assumed to be a prerequisite for a moral life.
Significantly, Obama’s insistent attention to the diversity of the
American religious landscape does not stop with attention to the multiple traditions of belief and unbelief that inhabit it. Religious traditions themselves are highly diverse, and reflect theological strains that
push in very different political and social directions. Even if all Americans were Christian, he asks pointedly: “whose Christianity would we
teach in the schools? James Dobson’s or Al Sharpton’s?…Or should we
just stick to the Sermon on the Mount—a passage that is so radical that
it’s doubtful that our Defense Department would survive its application?”37 Attention to theological diversity is critical because it exposes
the distortions that come from any bloc or wholesale appeal to a religion to ground identity.
Although Obama advocates cutting the cord between national
identity and religion, features of the campaign and his inauguration
reveal how tightly bound they remain. Consider, for example, the
ready agreement of the candidates to accept the invitation of prominent evangelical minister and author Rick Warren to participate in a
nationally televised serial interview at his Saddleback Church, and
to answer such questions as “what does it mean to you to trust in
Christ?”38 That a conservative evangelical Protestant minister could
broker such an event, CNN broadcast it, and the public not express
outrage captures the ready alignment and blend of nation, state, and
Christianity in 21st-century America. Or consider some of the rituals of
the presidential inaugural ceremony that he chose to continue despite
their symbolic tension with his vision. We have become so familiar
with them that we fail to see their role in sustaining the religion-nation
continuum. Just think of the tradition going back to our first president
of taking the oath of office on the Bible, a practice, incidentally, that not
all presidents followed. Or think of his decision to continue the tradition, going back to Franklin Roosevelt in 1937, of opening and closing
prayers at the inauguration. Although his selection of Rick Warren
and Glen Lowrey, an African-American civil rights leader, provided a
measure of racial and political diversity, these two Protestant ministers
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did not symbolize Obama’s vision of transcending the historic links of
nation and Christianity. When the news broke, I was in a group that
participated in an interesting thought experiment, trying (to no avail)
to identify two names that would signal religious diversity adequately.
Obama’s vision strains against the presidential inaugural rituals that
work to sustain the alignment of religion and nation identity. As these
strains intensify, I think we will see an end to prayers at presidential
inaugurations.
Rejecting a version of secularism that quarantines religion in the private domain, and one that takes Christianity as the privileged source of
American identity and democratic values, Obama advances an alternative that envisions a more pluralistic interactive border between
religions and the secular. This way of imagining the religion-secular
divide is driven by both political and theological convictions. In other
words, it is not simply a commitment to a pluralistic democratic secular politics that underlies this approach, but also a particular perspective on religion. Again we bump up against the fact that models for
negotiating the relationship of religious and secular domains rely upon
working out both sides of the equation. Whether one envisions conflict,
fusion, or more pluralistic interactions between religion and the secular depends fundamentally on how one defines not just the secular, but
religion as well. There are two currents that merge in Obama’s perspective on religion that contribute to the plural, interactionist model that
he embraces: a sense of religion as personal spirituality, and the tradition of black liberation theology.
He stands within a liberal tradition of religion that is marked by
inclusivity, antipathy to dogma and religious organizations, and an
eclectic appreciation for diverse sources of moral and spiritual illumination. He has, as he puts it, a “polyglot” background, acknowledging
a wide variety of influences across religious traditions, cultures, and
geographical regions, from Africa, to Indonesia, to Hawaii. Combined
with his mother’s anthropological embrace of religious and cultural
diversity, it has made him highly suspicious of religious dogmas or any
claims to have a “monopoly on the truth.”39 His eclectic background
convinces him that, “there are many paths to the same place.”40 This
inclusive theological sensibility also impels him to embrace doubt as a
welcome shadow of religious conviction, rather than its enemy. “Religion at its best,” he remarks, “comes with a big dose of doubt.”41 This is
not an off-the-cuff comment, but a conviction that was featured on his
official campaign website, with a prominently displayed quote by E.J.
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Dionne, remarking that, “Obama offers the first faith testimony I have
heard from any politician that speaks honestly about the uncertainties of belief.” Expounding on this theme in a recent address, Obama
explains that doubt should not replace faith, but it should “humble” us
and “compel us to remain open, and curious, and eager to continue the
moral and spiritual debate.”42
If his eclectic, personalist, critically reflective take on religion is
one strand that accounts for his vision of the religion/secular divide,
then his participation in the liberation traditions of the black church
is another. It is a Christian faith shaped by the “particular attributes
of the historically black church” that emerged out of its centuries-long
struggle against slavery and racism. Because of this history, he claims,
“the black church understands in an intimate way the Biblical call to
feed the hungry and cloth the naked and challenge powers and principalities.”43 This is not a spiritualized version of faith focusing only
on belief, or personal experience, or the otherworldy—all variations
that lend themselves to privatization. Nor is it an appeal to religion to
ground national identity and values. He was drawn to this tradition,
he claims, because of its power to “spur social change,” convincing
him that faith is not a set of private beliefs or merely compensation
for the pain and injustices of life, but “an active, palpable agent in the
world.”44 It is, as he depicts it, a sense of relationship to all forms of life
that carries the imperative to work towards the common good. This
means, as he most frequently puts it, “we are our brother’s keeper, we
are our sister’s keeper.”45
In Obama’s spiritual universe the distinction between religion and
the secular is both powerfully affirmed, and yet also bridged. It is
affirmed in and through a principled commitment to the constitutional
separation of church and state, the decoupling of religion and national
identity, and the democratic virtue of translating religious values and
visions into a more universal language that fellow citizens within a
diverse society can understand. But the boundary is hardly a high wall
that separates and isolates religious faith from secular knowledge or
the practices of the political and social world. In his words, “religious
commitment did not require me to suspend critical thinking, disengage from the battle for economic or social justice, or otherwise retreat
from the world that I knew and loved.”46 This way of envisioning the
religion-secular alignment is not laicist secularism or a Christian secularism that asserts a rather static religious ground for national identity
and the democratic project. It has the ingredients of a far more dynamic
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and pluralistic engagement of religious and secular traditions within
public space. These include a more fluid boundary between them, as
well as a more inclusive, eclectic, and non-dogmatic take on religion.
For some, the rubric of “spirituality” more adequately captures the
form of religiosity that refuses some of the defining features of religion
as conventionally understood. Evidence suggests this form of religion
is on the rise, not just in Obama’s electability, but also in recent polls
that track American attitudes to religion.47 The religious landscape is
growing more diverse, Protestantism will soon be a minority religion,
and the number of those identifying as unaffiliated or nonbelievers
is among the fastest growing segment. There is, moreover, a striking
fluidity across religious boundaries, as individuals increasingly shop
the spiritual marketplace in their personal quest for a more tailor-made
religion.
IV. Concluding Reflections
In working out the appropriate role of religion in American public life
we are inevitably contending with the major currents that have been in
play in recent decades. Both of the major streams have pushed a captivating but ultimately misleading picture of the opposition between
religion and secularism. Escaping from this picture and recognizing
the cross-fertilization across these currents is critical to fashioning a
more constructive response to the place of religion in a religiously plural, democratic, secular state. The story of a secular America is as misleading as a story of a Christian America, neither able to illuminate the
interplay between the religious-secular divide in our nation’s history.
The metaphor of a “double stranded helix” better captures the way
in which religious, primarily Protestant, and secular democratic principles have collaborated in shaping our past and present. Although an
apt metaphor for an earlier time, our challenge today is to multiply
the strands to make room for the greater diversity of voices among us.
Moving in this direction requires the further decoupling of religion
and national identity, the further de-privileging of Christianity—from
presidential ceremonies to the practices and culture of the military—
and greater collective will to free electoral politics from mobilizations
around religious identity.
Making room for this interplay reflects both democratic and theological convictions. To advance this model requires that we work both
sides of the aisle, so to speak. It is necessary to counter the deeply
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rooted assumption that secularism and democracy are so tightly linked
that they necessarily demand the privatization of religion. Religious
voices and perspectives are appropriate democratic expressions and
oftentimes valuable moral resources for reflecting on matters of our
common life. Their public role belongs within the sphere of civil society, but not in relation to the symbols, practices, and institutions of the
state, nation, and electoral politics. American Christians might imagine
this as the disenfranchisement of Christianity, given its privileged role
in our nation’s history—as a surrender to the religion of secularism. Yet
I would argue, in the tradition of the 17th-century Protestant dissenter
Roger Williams, that moving in this direction is essential to preserving
the purity of the spiritual life from the corruptions of worldly affairs.
Moving in this direction liberates Christian faith from its entanglements with state and politics. American Christianity has too often
played a priestly role in sacralizing the nation and its mission, rather
than a prophetic role. Cutting its privileged ties to state and nation can
unleash this prophetic power.
Developing a more interactive and pluralistic border zone between
religions and secular discourses and practices is the further extension
of a mediating tradition that can be traced back to a long line of American thinkers who sought to integrate the cross currents of religion,
democracy, and science.48 The election of Barack Obama brings a spotlight onto this tradition, and captures in his rhetoric and symbolically
in his life story the globalizing impulses of this tradition that he may
be peculiarly positioned to advance. This directional shift has become
increasingly urgent. The colliding and mixing of cultures and identities
has accelerated through new technologies and population migrations.
Telling a better story about the dynamics of religion and American
national identity and politics is not only important for purposes of
American civic life but for cultivating a more cosmopolitan horizon
within which to negotiate the multiple religious and secular traditions
that jostle in the global public square.
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